Auditor Reporting under Section 404: The Association between the Internal Control and Going Concern Audit Opinions by GOH, Beng Wee
Singapore Management University
Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University
Research Collection School Of Accountancy School of Accountancy
4-2012
Auditor Reporting under Section 404: The
Association between the Internal Control and
Going Concern Audit Opinions
Beng Wee GOH
Singapore Management University, bwgoh@smu.edu.sg
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1911-3846.2012.01180.x
Follow this and additional works at: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soa_research
Part of the Accounting Commons, Business Law, Public Responsibility, and Ethics Commons,
and the Corporate Finance Commons
This Journal Article is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Accountancy at Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management
University. It has been accepted for inclusion in Research Collection School Of Accountancy by an authorized administrator of Institutional
Knowledge at Singapore Management University. For more information, please email libIR@smu.edu.sg.
Citation
GOH, Beng Wee. Auditor Reporting under Section 404: The Association between the Internal Control and Going Concern Audit
Opinions. (2012). Contemporary Accounting Research. 30, (3), 970-995. Research Collection School Of Accountancy.
Available at: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soa_research/934




Auditor Reporting under Section 404: The Association between the Internal Control and 




Beng Wee Goh 
School of Accountancy 











School of Economics and Management 














*  Corresponding author 
 
 
We thank Bryan Church, Qi Chen, Jagan Krishnan, Yan Zhang, Yinqi Zhang and conference 
participants at the 2007 AAA Annual Meetings for helpful comments. Jayanthi Krishnan 
acknowledges research support from the Temple University Summer Research Fellowship and 
the Fox School Merves Research Fellowship. 
 






Section 404 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and Auditing Standard No. 2 introduced integrated audits 
of internal control over financial reporting and the financial statements. Since the internal control 
and audit reports are joint products of the audit process, we examine whether the issuance of an 
internal control material weakness opinion (MWO) influences, other things equal, the issuance of 
a going concern audit opinion (GCO). Using a sample of financially stressed companies, we find 
that the issuance of a MWO increases the likelihood of a GCO, suggesting that auditors do 
respond to the uncertainty surrounding a MWO by issuing a GCO. Further analyses reveal that 
the positive association between MWO and GCO obtains for company-level material weaknesses, 
which are known to be difficult to “audit-around”, and for more litigious industries. We also 
compare these results with those for a Section 302 sample with manager-reported (but not 
audited) material weaknesses, and find that the material weakness reported under Section 302 
does not impact the GCO. Hence, the auditors respond to the uncertainty surrounding material 
weaknesses only when they issue MWOs, and not due to the existence of material weaknesses 
per se – that is, the issuance of a MWO seems to induce further conservatism in the auditor’s 
GCO decision. We conclude that researchers and policymakers should consider the overall effect 
of Section 404 on the financial statement audit.  
 
Keywords: Going concern opinion, Material weakness opinion, SOX 404, Auditing Standard No. 




Section 404 of the Sarbanes Oxley (SOX) Act requires companies’ independent auditors 
to provide an opinion on their clients’ internal control over financial reporting (ICFR), in 
addition to the opinion on their clients’ financial statements (U.S. Congress 2002). In 2004, the 
Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) issued Auditing Standard No. 2 (AS2), 
An Audit of Internal Control over Financial Reporting Performed in Conjunction with an Audit 
of Financial Statements, which provided guidance to auditors for ICFR audits (PCAOB 2004). 
AS2 was subsequently replaced by Auditing Standard No. 5 (AS5).1 Unlike traditional audits of 
the financial statements, AS2 and AS5 require an “integrated audit of internal control and 
financial statements” because the “objectives of and work involved in performing both an 
attestation of management's assessment of internal control and an audit of the financial 
statements are closely interrelated” (PCAOB 2003a). Since, in effect, the internal control and the 
financial statement audit reports are joint products of the audit process, it is important to 
investigate the relation between the internal control and financial statement audit opinions.  
In this paper, we explore the association between the two audit opinions by examining 
whether the issuance of an adverse internal control material weakness opinion (MWO) 
influences, other things equal, the issuance of a going concern audit opinion (GCO) for 
financially stressed companies.2 Although the two opinions are the result of an integrated audit 
process, they serve different purposes. The GCO reflects the auditor’s view of the financial 
condition of its client, indicating whether (in the auditor’s opinion) the client will continue to be 
a going concern for a period of twelve months beyond the financial year end. The MWO reflects 
                                                        
1 Auditing Standard No. 5, An Audit of Internal Control over Financial Reporting That is Integrated with an Audit of 
Financial Statements, became effective for fiscal years ending November 15, 2007 (PCAOB 2007). As we discuss 
later, the change in standards was effected in response to concerns that AS2 led to inefficient audits.  
2 Technically, a reference to potential “going concern” problems in an audit report is a modification to the audit 
opinion of whether the financial statements are stated in accordance with GAAP. We refer to such a modified audit 
report as a going concern opinion. 
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the auditor’s opinion on whether there are material weaknesses in internal control, and therefore 
the likelihood that material misstatements in the financial statements will not be detected or 
prevented.  
Despite this difference, the two opinions could be connected. We posit that three factors 
determine whether an adverse MWO will trigger a GCO, given that the firm is financially 
distressed. First, although the GCO refers to the client’s financial viability, it is issued with the 
auditor also stating – in its opinion paragraph – that the client’s financial statements are stated 
“fairly in accordance with GAAP.” Reliable reporting is necessary for the auditor to be able to 
forecast cash flows and other aspects of the client’s performance, in order to make the going 
concern opinion decision.3 The going concern opinion decision is a difficult and ambiguous task 
(Chow et al. 1987; Carcello and Neal 2000) with grey areas that require auditor judgment.4 
Previous work has argued that, other things equal, auditors can move their “threshold” (i.e., 
become more conservative) for issuing the GCO in response to factors such as uncertainties and 
litigation risk (Francis and Krishnan 1999, 2002; Rosner 2003). Thus because the MWO 
indicates uncertainty about the potential reliability of the financial statements, it may also affect 
the ability to forecast the going concern status for a financially stressed client, thus triggering the 
GCO.5  
Second, the negative consequences associated with the MWO can make it difficult for 
                                                        
3 For example, in its 10-K filing for the year ended December 31, 2003, Sonus Network Inc. discloses that it faced 
shareholder class action, the allegation being that “we lacked adequate internal controls and were therefore unable to 
ascertain our true financial condition.” 
4 Similarly, the MWO is also issued under situations of significant uncertainty (Earley et al. 2008; Hoitash et al. 
2008) and “…criteria for judging misstatement likelihood and materiality are likely complex to apply in practice” 
(Bedard and Graham  2011). 
5 In theory, the auditor must tailor audit procedures to offset the material weakness sufficiently to ensure reliable 
financial reporting, before making the GCO decision. Therefore, the MWO need not impact the GCO as long as the 
auditor can “audit around” the material weakness and obtain reasonable assurance about the reliability (or fairness) 
of financial reporting. At the extreme, a complete inability to audit around the material weakness may result in a 
scope limitation opinion. In practice, less extreme situations are more likely. 
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companies in financial distress to obtain new financing because it increases financing costs 
(Beniesh et al. 2008; Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. 2009; Dhaliwal et al. 2011; Kim et al. 2011). If the 
auditor perceives such future difficulties, this would impact the GCO decision. Third, some 
responders to the AS2 proposal pointed out that both companies and their auditors may be 
subject to greater litigation risk when a MWO is issued.6 If this increases the auditor’s perceived 
litigation risk, the issuance of a MWO can further influence the auditor’s GCO decision. Such 
perceptions can be further heighted by the requirement in AS2 (and now AS5) that the auditor 
explicitly state that it considered the effect of the MWO on the financial-statement audit 
opinion.7 
We examine the association between the MWO and the GCO, using a sample of 1,110 
financially stressed firms that reported internal control and audit opinions under SOX Section 
404 during the period 2004 to 2009. 8  We find that the issuance of a MWO increases the 
likelihood of a GCO significantly, after controlling for factors that prior studies have found to be 
associated with a GCO. This result holds when we control for potential endogeneity of the 
MWOs, to incorporate the possibility that our finding is driven by unobserved latent factors that 
                                                        
6 Agilent Technologies argues that AS2 “… will lead to disclosure of many significant deficiencies which may 
aggregate to a material weakness judgment and which may cause shareholders and third parties to consider the risk 
of material misstatement to be much greater than it actually is.” Similarly, Health Insurance Plan of Greater New 
York states that the “auditor’s attestation of management’s assessment of internal control and the effectiveness of 
those controls is tantamount to a guarantee or warranty that the company’s internal controls over financial reporting 
are effective and result in financial statements that are free of material misstatement.” All comments on AS2 can be 
found at http://pcaobus.org/Rules/Rulemaking/Pages/Docket008Comments.aspx. 
7 See paragraphs 193-196 of AS2 (PCAOB 2004). These paragraphs refer to the timing and content of tests that go 
into the formation of the audit opinion and not the going concern modification. However, to the extent that the audit 
report is viewed as a whole, the requirement for such a statement can heighten perceived litigation risk. 
8 Restricting the sample to financially stressed companies is important because financial distress – the key factor 
triggering the GCO – can also be one cause for the existence of material weaknesses. Consequently, in the absence 
of controls for financial distress, there could be a mechanical positive association between material weaknesses and 
GCOs. By confining the sample to distressed firms and further controlling for distress in our multivariate analyses, 




drive both GCOs and MWOs. Hence, the empirical evidence suggests that auditors do respond to 
the uncertainty surrounding a MWO by issuing a GCO.   
Further analyses corroborate this evidence. Although in theory the auditor can “audit 
around” the material weakness, and ensure that the financial statements are reliable enough to 
opine on, it is not clear it can always do so. Therefore, we expect that the strength of the 
association will differ according to the degree of uncertainty engendered by the MWO, and the 
degree to which the auditor can audit around the weakness to render its financial statement 
opinion. We compare the association between the MWO and the GCO for MWOs arising out of 
company-level weaknesses and account-specific weaknesses. We find that the former, which are 
more difficult to audit around (Ettredge et al. 2006; Doyle et al. 2007a), but not the latter, are 
associated with GCOs.  
Next, we examine whether the expectation that the material weaknesses will be remedied 
– which reduces the uncertainty surrounding the MWO – impacts the strength of the association 
between MWO and GCO. Using the removal of the MWO in the subsequent year as the measure 
of expected remediation in the year the opinion is issued, we find that the association between 
MWO and GCO holds only for those material weaknesses which are not subsequently 
remediated. We also examine whether the issuance of a MWO may hinder the ability of a firm to 
raise capital in the subsequent year, possibly inducing conservatism in the auditor’s going 
concern opinion. We find a significant negative association between MWOs and subsequent 
changes in current debt, and a negative but marginally significant association between MWOs 
and subsequent changes in common stock in the subsequent year, suggesting that the MWO is 
likely to adversely affect future financing, triggering a GCO in conjunction with the MWO.  
 6 
 
Finally, we examine whether it is the auditor’s material weakness opinion rather than the 
disclosure of material weakness that is associated with the GCO. Section 404 was preceded in 
2002 by the introduction of a related internal control rule, Section 302 of SOX, which required 
management (but not auditor) reports on the effectiveness of disclosure controls. We estimate 
our model using data for the Section 302 regime to examine the association between GCO and 
material weakness disclosures. Interestingly, we do not document an association between the 
existence of material weaknesses, as reported by management, and the GCO. Taken together, our 
results suggest that the MWO issued under SOX Section 404 does increase the likelihood of a 
GCO, while the existence of material weaknesses in the Section 302 disclosures does not. Thus, 
auditors seem to respond to the uncertainties surrounding a material weakness by issuing a GCO 
only when they have to issue a MWO.  
Our paper makes three primary contributions. First, unlike most previous research, we 
examine the impact of the internal control opinion on auditors’ decisions. The vast majority of 
the attention on Sections 404 and 302 of SOX has focused on the causes of the internal control 
weaknesses revealed by the ICFR auditor and management reports, and their consequences, 
measured by stock price reactions and cost of debt and equity (Ogneva et al. 2007; Ashbaugh-
Skaife et al. 2009; Dhaliwal et al. 2011). We focus instead on the overall audit, which consists of 
both the internal control and financial statement audits. Second, whereas previous GCO studies 
have estimated empirical models based on the financial statement audit only, our study is the first 
to extend the analysis to an integrated audit of internal control and the financial statements. Thus, 
we argue, studies examining the cross-sectional variations in the incidence of the GCO must 
consider how the internal control audit affects the outcome. Third, we shed some light on the 
effects of the policies relating to internal control. The purpose of Sections 302 and 404 was 
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primarily to provide information on the internal controls, thus enhancing investor understanding 
of the quality of firms’ financial reporting. Although this was expected to enhance the quality of 
financial reporting, none of the policy statements suggest that policymakers envisaged an impact 
on the likelihood of the GCO. To the extent the increase in the GCO likelihood is a result of 
auditor conservatism, our finding suggests the need for a broader evaluation of the effects of 
SOX 404. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the research 
motivation and hypothesis. Section 3 describes our research design and sample selection. 
Sections 4 and 5 describe the empirical results. Section 6 concludes. 
2. Motivation and Hypothesis Development 
Background 
The Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX) Act of 2002 includes two sections relating to internal control 
reporting. Section 302, introduced in 2002, requires quarterly management reports on the 
effectiveness of the company’s disclosure controls. Section 404, introduced in 2004, requires 
companies’ independent auditors to provide an opinion on their clients’ ICFR, in addition to the 
opinion on their clients’ financial statements (U.S. Congress 2002). The intended effect of the 
rules is to improve the reliability of firms’ financial reporting (PCAOB 2004; Donaldson 2005). 
However, Section 404 has been the subject of intense debate as critics maintain that the high 
costs of complying with it are not commensurate with its perceived benefits (Michaels 2003; 
DeFond and Francis 2005; Powell 2005; Romano 2005).  
Guidance to auditors for ICFR audits was provided by AS2, which was effective for 
accelerated filers in November 2004 (PCAOB 2004).9 AS2 introduced an integrated audit of 
                                                        
9 Accelerated filers are defined as companies (1) with public float (aggregate market value of voting and non-voting 
common equity held by non-affiliates) greater than $75 million, (2) that have been subject to Exchange Act 
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internal control and financial statements. The standard includes extensive discussions of the 
relationship between the internal control audit procedures for the two audit opinions (see, for 
example, paragraphs 145-158 in AS2). Particularly relevant to our study, the standard discusses 
the effect of a MWO on the financial statement opinion. Specifically, when the auditor issues a 
MWO and a clean audit opinion, it must state in its audit opinion that the material weakness  
“…was considered in determining the nature, timing, and extent of audit tests applied in our 
audit of the 20X3 financial statements, and this report does not affect our report dated [date of 
report] on those financial statements. (paragraph 194, PCAOB 2004).”10 A similar disclosure is 
required when a MWO and a non-clean financial statement opinion are issued.  
In 2007, the PCAOB issued Auditing Standard No. 5 (PCAOB 2007) to replace AS2. 
AS5 emphasized a top-down, risk-based approach to ICFR audits, with the intent of eliminating 
the inefficiencies that had been identified in the operation of AS2. Like AS2, AS5 specifically 
connects the two opinions, stating that the auditor should “disclose whether his or her opinion on 
the financial statements was affected by the adverse opinion on internal control over financial 
reporting.”  
Thus, SOX Section 404 and the related auditing standards emphasize the integration of 
the audits of an entity’s internal controls and its financial statements, and consequently the 
internal control and audit reports are joint products of the audit process. It is therefore important 
to investigate the relation between the two audit opinions.  
Impact of the Material Weakness Opinion on the Going Concern Opinion 
The GCO expresses the auditor’s view that there is substantial doubt about its client’s 
                                                                                                                                                                                   
reporting requirements for at least 12 calendar months, (3) that have filed at least one annual report, and (4) that are 
not eligible to use Forms 10-KSB and 10-QSB for their annual and quarterly reports. SOX Section 404 was initially 
applicable to accelerated filers. Nonaccelerated filers were eventually expected to comply, but the effective date for 
compliance was repeatedly postponed. However, the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform Act of 2010 has permanently 
exempted non-accelerated filers from compliance with Section 404. 
10 The wording is modified if a combined report is issued for the ICFR and financial statement opinions. 
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ability to continue as a going concern for a period not exceeding one year beyond the financial 
statement date (Statement of Auditing Standard No. 59, AICPA 1988; Auditing Standard 1, 
PCAOB 2003b). Although a firm’s financial condition is the underlying factor triggering a GCO, 
the decision requires considerable judgment (Chow et al. 1987; Carcello and Neal 2000). 
Auditing standards provide a list of circumstances, such as loan defaults, work stoppages, and 
legal proceedings, which could raise doubts about the entity’s ability to continue as a going 
concern. SAS No. 59 requires auditors to assess management’s plans to overcome the problems 
causing the potential going concern problem and, if not satisfied with these plans, issue a GCO. 
Internal control problems are not mentioned on this list or indeed anywhere in the going concern 
standards. However, as discussed above, the ICFR audit standards state that the internal control 
audit opinion (MWO) should be considered when the auditor issues the financial statement 
opinion. 
Given the inherent ambiguity of the going concern auditing standard, auditors likely 
develop a financial distress “range” over which a GCO can be issued and select a threshold 
within that range to actually issue a GCO. Previous studies have argued that auditors move this 
threshold down – i.e., become more conservative – in the face of uncertainties regarding, for 
example, future losses (Nelson and Kinney 1997), potential litigation (Krishnan and Krishnan 
1996; Geiger and Raghunandan 2002), or accounting accruals (Francis and Krishnan 1999).  
Can the issuance of a MWO be a factor that causes auditors to lower the threshold for the 
GCO? Consider a client whose financial condition indicates a potential going concern problem. 
Auditing standards for auditing financial statements require the auditor to acquire an 
understanding of internal control over financial reporting and conduct tests to assess control risk 
should the auditor decide to rely on controls. Assume that the auditor’s understanding of the 
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client’s internal control has revealed a potential material weakness, indicating heightened control 
risk, requiring the auditor to design its audit to offset the risk. The standard audit risk model 
suggests that auditors adjust their substantive tests (e.g., choosing not to rely on controls) to 
maintain audit risk at acceptable levels. The auditor assesses control risk as high, designs 
substantive tests and, where necessary, requires clients to fix problems relating to the reliability 
of the financial statements. Then, based on the financial statements that have been judged (with 
reasonable assurance) as being reliable, the auditor must decide whether to issue a GCO.  
Because the GCO decision is itself fraught with uncertainty, the outcome must depend 
partly on the extent to which the auditor can effectively audit around the material weaknesses. At 
one extreme, if the auditor is able to successfully offset the material weaknesses through audit 
procedures and the financial statements are judged to be reliable, the GCO can be issued 
independent of whether a MWO is issued. At the other extreme, if the auditor is unable to audit 
around the material weaknesses and the reliability of the financial statements cannot be ensured, 
it can disclaim an opinion (i.e., not issue a MWO) or withdraw from the engagement.11 In 
practice, however, it is likely that the extent to which the auditor can audit around the material 
weakness, and therefore the uncertainty surrounding the existence of the material weakness, lies 
between the two extremes, causing the auditor to become conservative in the issuance of the 
GCO.  
We posit that three factors can lead to auditor conservatism in the face of a MWO. First, 
the implication in the audit risk model that audit plans are adjusted adequately to offset variations 
in control risk is not supported by research evidence. Studies that use pre-SOX data (e.g., Mock 
and Wright 1999) do not find that auditors vary audit plans or audit effort based on control 
                                                        
11 AS2 (and later AS5) explains that the auditor can issue a disclaimer due to scope limitations if it cannot apply the 
necessary procedures to express an opinion on ICFR. If however, the scope restrictions are imposed by management, 
the auditor should resign from the engagement. 
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reliance. Likewise, studies that used audit fees as a proxy for effort (e.g., O’Keefe et al. 1994; 
Felix et al. 2001) find no association for the pre-SOX period. However, based on data for the 
post-SOX years, Raghunandan and Rama (2006), Hoitash et al. (2008), and Hogan and Wilkins 
(2008) find a positive association between the presence of material weaknesses as disclosed in 
SOX 302/SOX 404 disclosures and audit fees. But, as Hogan and Wilkins (2008) point out, the 
increased fees could also reflect a risk premium rather than increased effort.  
If in fact audit plans are not sufficiently risk-adjusted in the presence of material 
weaknesses, there is uncertainty regarding the extent of assurance of financial statement 
reliability. This could make it more difficult for the auditor to evaluate the future financial 
performance or cash flows of the firm and hence, the ability of the firm to operate as a going 
concern. For example, companies that face uncertainties about going concern present 
management plans – including details about intentions to increase cash flows by issuing more 
debt or equity, and/or reduce spending (Behn et al. 2001) – to overcome financial stress. If the 
auditor’s assessment of management plans leads to the conclusion that these are credible 
mitigating factors, the auditor may not issue a GCO. The credibility of these plans however 
depends on the perceived accuracy of future forecasts, which in turn depends on the reliability of 
financial reporting.12 Consequently, the auditor may respond to the heightened uncertainty about 
mitigating factors and become more conservative (i.e., move its threshold) in the GCO 
decision.13 
                                                        
12 For instance, Feng et al. (2009) find a positive relation between internal control quality and the accuracy of 
management guidance, consistent with ineffective internal controls causing errors in internal management reports. 
13 An example is provided in PHH Corporation’s 10-K filing for the year ended Dec 31, 2005 
(http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/77776/000095012306014446/y26027e10vk.htm). The audit report states 
“As discussed in Note 28 to the consolidated financial statements, the uncertainty about the Company’s ability to 
comply with certain of its financing agreement covenants … raises substantial doubt about its ability to continue as a 
going concern.” Note 28 mentions the internal control issues: “Due to the existence of material weaknesses in the 
Company’s internal control over financial reporting and delays in completing the 2005 audited financial statements, 
it is now uncertain whether the Company can issue its 2006 quarterly financial statements within this extended 
 12 
 
Second, the negative consequences associated with material weaknesses can make it 
more difficult for companies that are already in financial distress to obtain capital. Beneish et al. 
(2008) and Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. (2009) find that ineffective internal controls are associated 
with increased cost of equity, possibly reflecting increased information risk. Similarly, Dhaliwal 
et al. (2011) and Kim et al. (2011) provide evidence that MWOs are associated with increased 
cost of borrowing. In addition, Kim et al. (2011) find that borrowers with company-level 
weaknesses face stiffer loan conditions, in terms of borrowing rates and collateral requirements, 
than those with account-specific weaknesses. The increased costs and difficulties of raising 
capital for firms with MWOs can reduce their ability to overcome the financial distress they are 
facing, exacerbating the going concern problems. If the auditor anticipates these negative 
consequences to the issuance of a MWO, it is also likely to issue a GCO. 
Third, some responders to the AS2 proposal pointed out that both companies and their 
auditors may be subject to greater litigation risk when a MWO is issued. As discussed, the 
internal control auditing standard explicitly requires the auditor to consider the internal control 
opinion when determining the financial statement audit opinion. Thus, any litigation concern 
regarding the MWO is likely to carry over to the GCO due to the jointness of the two opinions.  
Krishnan and Krishnan (1996) and Geiger and Raghunandan (2002) have provided evidence that 
auditors become conservative in the issuance of the GCO when faced with higher litigation risk. 
Thus, the issuance of a MWO can further induce conservatism in the auditor’s GCO decision.  
In sum, although in theory the GCO need not be impacted by a MWO, the issuance of a 
MWO can in practice cause the auditor to move their “threshold” for issuing the GCO, thus 
increasing the likelihood of a GCO. Therefore, we test the following null hypothesis: 
                                                                                                                                                                                   
date…the uncertainty about the Company’s ability to meet its financial statement delivery requirements raises 




H1:  There is no difference in the propensity of auditors to issue GCOs to financially 
stressed companies to which they issue a MWO and to those to which they do not issue 
a MWO. 
 
In testing our hypothesis, we also extend it to distinguish between two types of material 
weaknesses, company-level and account-specific weaknesses. Company-level material 
weaknesses relate to fundamental problems such as the control environment or the overall 
financial reporting process, and account-specific weaknesses pertain to transactions and account 
balances. As Moody’s Investor Services notes, some company-level material weaknesses cannot 
be audited around effectively because of the “pervasive nature” of the underlying internal control 
problems. Thus, although in theory, auditors can deal with material weaknesses through 
substantive tests, it may be difficult in the case of a company-level weakness to determine 
exactly where substantive testing should occur (Doyle et al 2007a). Further, Moody’s suggests 
that company-level material weaknesses call into question not only management’s ability to 
prepare accurate financial reports, but also its ability to control the business (Doss and Jonas 
2004). It is likely therefore that the ambiguities in the GCO decision are heightened in the 
presence of a MWO pertaining to a company-level weakness. Therefore we extend our tests of 
H1 to distinguish between company-level and account-specific material weaknesses.  
3. Model and Sample Selection 
Regression Model 
We use the following logistic regression model to test our hypothesis:  
GCO = α0 + α1MWO + α2PROBANKZ + α3SIZE + α4AGE + α5BETA + α6VOLATILITY  
+ α7RETURN + α8LEV + α9CLEV + α10DLOSS + α11INVESTMENT + α12BIG4 + α13OCF + 
α14REPORTLAG+ α15PRIORGCO + α16SEGMENTS + α17RESTRUCTURING + ε   (1) 
GCO is an indicator variable that equals 1 if the auditor issues a going concern opinion, and 0 
otherwise. The model includes MWO, an indicator variable that equals 1 if the auditor issues an 
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adverse material weakness opinion on the client’s internal control, and 0 otherwise, and control 
variables based on previous work. If the auditor’s GCO decision is influenced by the issuance of 
a Section 404 adverse internal control opinion, then the coefficient on MWO will be positive.   
Control Variables 
 Our choice of control variables is based on previous work (e.g., Reynolds and Francis 
2001; DeFond et al. 2002; Li 2009). Two variables proxy for the degree of financial distress.  
PROBANKZ measures the probability of bankruptcy based on Zmijewski (1984), and DLOSS is a 
dummy variable indicating a loss in the prior year. Firm size (SIZE) is included to capture a 
number of factors, such as financial stress and client bargaining power vis-à-vis auditors 
(Krishnan and Krishnan 1996; Willenborg and McKeown 2001). Firm age (AGE) is included 
because younger firms are more susceptible to failure (Dopuch et al. 1987).  
 Following Dopuch et al. (1987) and DeFond et al. (2002), we include the following three 
market-based measures: BETA, the systematic risk of the firm’s daily stock returns over the fiscal 
year, RETURN, the market-adjusted stock return over the fiscal year, and VOLATILITY, the 
standard deviation (return volatility) of the residuals from the market return model. Two 
variables, firm leverage (LEV) and change in leverage (CLEV) capture the proximity to debt 
covenant violations, and therefore the likelihood of failure. INVESTMENT is a liquidity measure 
that captures the company’s ability to quickly raise cash. BIG4, indicating the Big 4 auditors, 
captures the difference in the propensity of the big audit firms to issue GCOs compared with the 
non-Big 4 audit firms (Francis and Krishnan 1999; Kim et al. 2003). OCF is cash flow from 
operations deflated by assets.   
 We include REPORTLAG, the number of days between the fiscal year end and the 
earnings announcement date, because previous studies find that the issuance of a GCO is 
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associated with longer reporting delays (Carcello et al. 1995; Raghunandan and Rama 1995). We 
also include PRIORGCO (indicating a GCO in the prior year) because GCO in the current period 
is known to be correlated with prior year GCO (Carcello and Neal 2000; Gul et al. 2009). 
Although the above variables are expected to impact the GCO, we note that some 
variables, for example firm size and financial distress, may also be related to the existence of 
material weaknesses. In addition, we include two variables that prior research (Krishnan 2005; 
Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. 2007; Doyle et al. 2007b) has identified as determinants of material 
weaknesses in internal control, and may also affect the GCO: the complexity of the firm’s 
operations measured by number of segments (SEGMENTS), and restructuring 
(RESTRUCTURING).  
Sample Selection 
Table 1, Panel A shows the sample selection procedure. Because the going concern modified 
audit opinion is generally issued for financially stressed companies (Reynolds and Francis 2001), 
we restrict our initial sample to stressed companies. Section 404 of SOX became effective for 
fiscal years ending on or after November 15, 2004. Hence, our sample period covers the years 
2004 to 2009. We start with all public firms on COMPUSTAT with year-ends from 2004 to 2009, 
for which we could compute the Altman financial distress Z-Score (Altman 1968).14 Then, we 
rank the sample firms by their Z-Score, and retain firms in the lowest quintile, that is, firms with 
the most severe financial distress problems. This procedure results in an initial sample of 7,947 
firm-year observations. We eliminate 6,644 firm-year observations for which the internal control 
or going concern opinions were not available on the Audit Analytics database. We then eliminate 
185 firm-year observations with missing data (for the control variables) on the Compustat and/or 
                                                        
14 As a sensitivity test, we also measure financial distress using the Zmijewski (1984) bankruptcy model to select the 
sample. The results are qualitatively similar to those reported in the paper.  
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CRSP databases. Finally, we eliminate eight firm-year observations in the financial services 
industry because, as noted by prior research (e.g., Carcello and Neal 2000; Gassen and Skaife 
2009), the financial distress models do not predict distress for these industries. The final sample 
consists of 1,110 firm-year observations. In Table 1, Panel B we present the industry distribution 
for the sample. Manufacturing forms the largest group, accounting for 68.4 percent of the GCOs 
and 45.6 percent of the MWOs.  The service industry is the second largest group, accounting for 
17.1 percent of the GCOs and 34.3 percent of the MWOs.    
 [Insert Tables 1 and 2 here] 
 
4. Empirical Results  
Univariate Differences 
Table 2 shows that 14 percent (i.e., 152/1,110) of our firm-year observations have GCOs 
and 13 percent (i.e., 149/1,110) have MWOs.15 Based on a chi-square test, there is a significant 
difference in the incidence of MWOs between the GCO firms and the non-GCO firms. About 24 
percent of the GCO firms have a MWO, and about 12 percent of the non-GCO firms have a 
MWO.  
Table 3, Panel A presents descriptive statistics. In Columns 1-3, we present comparisons 
between the GCO and non-GCO firms. Consistent with previous research (e.g., Carcello and 
Neal 2000), GCO firms are smaller (SIZE), more stressed (based on both PROBANKZ and 
DLOSS), more highly leveraged (LEV), and more likely to have received a GCO in the prior 
period (PRIORGCO) than the non-GCO firms. They also have lower operating cash flows (OCF), 
                                                        
15 Myers et al. (2008) report a 24 percent going concern rate for their financially distressed sample in 2002-2005. 
One reason our sample has a lower going concern rate is that it includes only accelerated filers, (which are subject to 
the Section 404 requirements, and for which the ICFR opinion is available) that are larger and tend to have a lower 
incidence of the going concern opinion. Further, the financial distress definition is different in the two studies.  If we 
do not impose the Section 404 audit opinion restriction, and use the same definition of financial distress as Myers et 
al. (2008), the going concern rate is 24.9 percent for the period 2004-2009. 
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lower investments (INVESTMENT), fewer operating segments (SEGMENTS), longer reporting 
delays (REPORTLAG), and are less likely to engage in restructuring activities 
(RESTRUCTURING) than the non-GCO firms. Further, GCO firms have greater stock return 
volatility (VOLATILITY) and lower market-adjusted returns (RETURN) than non-GCO firms.  
[Insert Table 3 here] 
Columns 4-6 present the comparisons between the MWO and non-MWO firms. 
Consistent with prior studies (Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. 2007; Doyle et al. 2007b), we find that the 
MWO firms have higher leverage (LEV) than firms without a MWO. In addition, the MWO 
firms have longer reporting lags (REPORTLAG), larger BETA (BETA), lower investments 
(INVESTMENT), and are more likely to engage in restructuring activities (RESTRUCTURING) 
than the non-MWO firms. Finally, the MWO firms are less likely to have Big 4 auditors than the 
non-MWO firms (BIG4).16 
Table 3, Panel B reports the pair-wise correlations among the variables. The upper-right-
hand portion of this table displays the Pearson product-moment correlations, and the lower-left-
hand portion displays the Spearman rank-order correlations. We discuss the Pearson correlations, 
but note that the Spearman correlations are generally consistent with the Pearson correlations. 
We do not find any unusual correlations that can raise concerns about multicollinearity.17 The 
MWO indicator variable is positively correlated with the GCO indicator variable, providing 
some initial evidence that the presence of a MWO may increase the likelihood of a GCO.  
[Insert Table 4 here] 
Logistic Regression Results for the Association between MWO and GCO 
                                                        
16 By contrast, Doyle et al. (2007b) and Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. (2007) document a positive association between BIG 
4 auditors and the likelihood of disclosing internal control problems. We attribute the difference to the fact that our 
sample is restricted to financially distressed firms, which are smaller and tend to be audited by the smaller audit 
firms. 
17 PRBANKZ and LEV have a high Spearman correlation. Our results do not change when we drop either one of 
these variables from the model. 
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Table 4 presents the logistic regression results for equation (1). Our main variable of 
interest is MWO, which tests the association between the incidence of a MWO and the likelihood 
of a GCO. The coefficient on MWO is 0.72, and is statistically significant (p-value = 0.04), 
indicating that the issuance of a MWO increases the likelihood of the issuance of a GCO. As 
discussed, auditors can move their “threshold” (i.e. become more conservative) for issuing the 
GCO in response to uncertainties and heightened litigation risk (Francis and Krishnan 1999, 
2002; Rosner 2003). We conjecture that the issuance of a MWO likely indicates increased 
uncertainty and litigation risk, making the auditor more conservative in its GCO decision.18 
Results for the control variables are generally in line with previous work. Smaller firms 
(SIZE), firms with greater financial distress (PROBANKZ), higher stock volatility (VOLATILITY), 
lower operating cash flows (OCF), lower stock returns (RETURN), and lower investments 
(INVESTMENT) are more likely to receive a GCO. Also, firms with longer financial reporting 
lags (REPORTLAG), firms audited by Big 4 auditors (BIG4), and firms with GCOs in the prior 
year (PRIORGCO) are more likely to receive a GCO.19,20  
Potential Endogeneity of MWO 
 Although our results above indicate that the MWO is positively associated with the GCO, 
it is possible that, despite the fairly comprehensive set of control variables included in the model, 
there are other underlying latent factors that drive both opinions. Alternatively, it is possible that, 
                                                        
18 To check if our results are sensitive to sample industry composition, we reran the logistic regression in Table 4 (1) 
after deleting the service industry and (2) confining the sample to manufacturing firms only.  In both cases, MWO 
has a positive and significant coefficient, with p-values of 0.08 and 0.06 for (1) and (2), respectively. The reduced 
significance can be attributed to smaller sample sizes. 
19 About 76.8 percent of our sample consists of Big 4 clients. We estimated our model for Big 4 clients only. The 
coefficient on MWO is positive and significant (p-value = 0.03) for Big 4 clients. We also partitioned our sample into 
large and small clients (using the sample median assets as the cutoff), and reran our model for the two groups. MWO 
has a positive significant coefficient for both groups, although with reduced statistical significance (p-value = 0.07 
and 0.1 for large and small clients, respectively).   
20 Our results are not sensitive to the inclusion of firms with prior year GCOs. When we drop the observations (n=68) 
with prior GCOs and rerun the model, we find that MWO continues to have a positive, significant coefficient (p-
value = 0.07). 
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because the two opinions are jointly produced, the relation between GCO and MWO is 
simultaneously determined. To examine these possibilities, we conduct supplementary tests that 
allow for endogeneity.  
First, we use the Heckman (1979) two-stage procedure. In the first stage, we estimate a 
probit regression of MWO on its determinants (see Appendix A), which are based on previous 
work (Krishnan 2005; Doyle et al. 2007b; Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. 2007).21 The probit estimates 
are presented in Appendix A. From this regression, we calculate the inverse Mills ratio, 
LAMBDA (see Heckman 1979; Leuz and Verrecchia 2000). In the second stage of this procedure, 
we include LAMBDA in equation (1) to control for the likelihood of self-selection into the MWO 
group. Table 5, Panel A, Columns 1-3 presents the second-stage regression results of the 
Heckman two-stage procedure, after controlling for LAMBDA. For brevity, we present the 
coefficients only for the test variable. We find that the coefficient on MWO remains positive and 
significant (p-value = 0.01), confirming our findings in Table 4. 
Second, we use a propensity score matching technique (LaLonde 1986) to create a 
matched control sample of non-MWO firms, based on the predicted probabilities from the probit 
regression described above. This matching process identifies control firms with the same 
predicted probabilities (thus incorporating the combined effect of the predictive variables) of 
                                                        
21 The models include several variables that proxy for firm complexity: firm size (MARKETCAP), the number of 
business segments (SEGMENTS), the presence of foreign operations (FOREIGNOP), the presence of 
merger/acquisition activity (MA) and the presence of restructuring activities (RESTRUCTURING). 
AGGREGATELOSS, a dummy variable indicating combined losses over two years, proxies for financial stress. We 
include firm age (AGE) because younger firms have generally been found to be vulnerable to internal control 
failures. Rapid growth is another factor that can cause firms to struggle to maintain the quality of internal control 
(Krishnan 2005). Consequently, we include EXTREMEGROWTH as an additional control. We include BIG4 and 
AUDITORCHANGE to capture differences in the likelihood of MWOs across auditor types and RESTATEMENT, 
indicating financial restatements, which have been found to be related to internal control deficiencies (Ashbaugh-
Skaife et al. 2007). Finally, we include industry affiliation to control for industry-specific factors that might affect 
internal control quality. The results in Appendix A show that financial health (AGGREGATELOSS), merger and 
acquisition activities (MA), restructuring activities (RESTRUCTURING), audit quality (BIG4), the occurrence of a 
restatement (RESTATEMENT), and the occurrence of an auditor change (AUDITORCHANGE) are significantly 
associated with the presence of MWs.  
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having a MWO as the test firms. Thus we have a combined sample of 264 observations, 
consisting of 132 MWO firms and 132 non-MWO (matched on propensity score) firms. We 
estimate equation (1) for this sample. The results, shown in Table 5, Panel A, Columns 4-6, 
indicate that the coefficient on MWO remains positive and significant (p-value < 0.01), again 
confirming the findings in Table 4.  
[Insert Table 5 here] 
Third, we consider whether the results in Table 4 reflect possible simultaneity between 
GCOs and MWOs. Although our focus is on whether the issuance of a MWO is more likely to 
induce the issuance of a GCO, it is possible that the auditor is also more likely to issue a MWO, 
given the existence of material weaknesses, when there is uncertainty regarding a going concern. 
There are two reasons why auditors may consider doing so at the margin. First, substantial 
doubts about a company’s ability to continue as a going concern are indicative of extreme 
financial distress, often accompanied by cash flow problems and recurring losses. If there are 
weaknesses in internal control, the company is unlikely to invest in fixing these weaknesses as it 
is more focused on its going concern status. Then, the auditor is less likely to expect the material 
weakness to be remedied and therefore, more willing to issue a MWO. Second, a GCO brings 
with it the probability of bankruptcy, along with additional scrutiny from regulators and other 
investigators. Since such scrutiny will include the weaknesses in internal controls (as it did for 
example, when the financial conditions at Enron and Rite Aid were investigated following 
revelations of financial distress), the auditor can, at the margin, become conservative with 
respect to issuing a MWO.22  
In Table 5, Panel B, we present estimates of a simultaneous-equations model of MWO 
                                                        
22 Companies with going concern problems often look for mergers or are acquired. Such transactions also result in 
closer scrutiny of the financial statements and can engender conservatism in the auditor’s MWO. 
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and GCO. The control variables for the GCO equation follow those in Table 4, and the control 
variables for the MWO equation follow those in Appendix A. For brevity, we present only the 
coefficients for the test variables. The results indicate that, after controlling for simultaneity, 
MWO is still positively associated with the likelihood of a GCO. However, there is also evidence 
of simultaneity between the two opinions. 
5. Additional Analysis 
We present several additional tests to support the results above. As discussed, we expect 
that the auditor’s threshold for issuing the GCO to a financially stressed firm with potential 
internal control problems depends on the degree of uncertainty engendered by the material 
weaknesses, and the auditor’s ability to offset the uncertainty with audit procedures sufficient to 
ensure reliability of financial reporting. In the first two sub-sections below, we examine 
situations where the uncertainty of, and/or the ability to audit around, the material weakness can 
vary. Then, we test whether the issuance of a MWO is associated with lower future financing 
which, we conjecture, may be a reason why the auditor may decide to also issue a GCO.  We also 
test whether the association between MWO and GCO varies across high- and low-litigation 
industries. Finally, we use disclosures from SOX Section 302 to examine the association between 
the existence of material weaknesses and the GCO. The purpose of this test is to examine 
whether it is the existence of material weaknesses, rather than the MWO (as hypothesized above), 
that drives the association. 
Company-Level versus Account-Specific Material Weaknesses  
As discussed in Section 2, material weaknesses relating to company-level problems are 
more difficult to audit around than account-specific weaknesses. This can increase the 
uncertainty regarding the reliability of the financial statements, making the auditor more 
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conservative in its GCO decision. If so, we would expect MWOs resulting from company-level 
weaknesses to have a stronger association with GCO, than MWOs resulting from account-
specific material weaknesses.  
We classify the MWO observations in our sample into those relating to company-level 
and account-specific material weaknesses.23 Fifty-six percent of the material weaknesses are 
classified as company-level weaknesses. Table 6, Panel A presents regression results replacing 
MWO with MW Company-Level and MW Account-Specific, which are indicator variables that 
equal 1 if the firm has a MWO pertaining to company-level and account-specific material 
weaknesses, respectively, and 0 otherwise. For brevity, we only report coefficients for the test 
variables. 
[Insert Table 6 here] 
We find that the coefficient on MW Company-Level is positive and significant (p-value < 
0.01) and the coefficient on MW Account-Specific is negative and insignificant (p-value = 0.73), 
suggesting that MWOs pertaining to company-level weaknesses, but not account-specific 
weaknesses, increase the likelihood of a GCO. Moreover, an F-test reveals that the coefficient on 
MW Company-Level is significantly larger than that on MW Account-Specific (p-value = 0.02).  It 
seems likely that the relatively greater inability to audit around company-level weaknesses (than 
account-specific weaknesses) creates more uncertainty about the reliability of client financial 
reporting. This in turn can make it more difficult for the auditor to assess the future financial 
performance or cash flows of the firm. Consequently, the auditor becomes more conservative in 
the GCO decision. 
                                                        
23 We follow prior work (e.g., Doyle et al. 2007a) in performing these classifications. Thus company-level material 
weaknesses include problems relating to the control environment, management override, the financial reporting 
process, the audit committee, the internal audit function, or the risk assessment function. Account-specific material 
weaknesses include problems relating to individual accounts/transactions, such as accounts receivable, inventories, 
and accrued liabilities. Following Doyle et al. (2007a), we classify observations with both company-level and 
account-specific weaknesses as having company-level weaknesses.  
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Remediation of Material Weaknesses  
 The discovery of a material weakness by the auditor or management may trigger action 
on the part of management to remediate the weakness, thus reducing the uncertainty about its 
effect on the reliability of future financial reporting (and therefore the reliability of the auditor’s 
current forecasts for the future), and/or the ability of the firm to raise capital in the subsequent 
year. Therefore, if an auditor is aware that the client is in the process of remediating the 
weakness, it is less likely to issue a GCO. To proxy for the future remediation status of the client 
at the time of issuance of the GCO, we examine the subsequent annual filing for each firm with a 
MWO (Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. 2008; Goh 2009). If the subsequent filing reveals the absence of a 
MWO, we assume that the firm had put a remediation plan in place at the time of the previous 
10-K filing and that the auditor is aware of the firm’s remediation plans.24 The proportion of 
MWOs in our sample (untabulated) that were remediated in the subsequent year is about 40 
percent.   
Table 6, Panel B presents a regression model in which we test whether remediation of 
material weaknesses has a differential effect on the issuance of the GCO. MW Sub-Remed (MW 
No-Sub-Remed) is an indicator variable that equals 1 if the material weakness firms remediate 
(do not remediate) their weaknesses in the subsequent year, and 0 otherwise. As in Panel A, we 
only report the results for the test variables. The coefficient on MW Sub-Remed is positive and 
insignificant (p-value = 0.28) and the coefficient on MW No-Sub-Remed is positive and 
significant (p-value = 0.05). An F-test reveals that the coefficient on MW No-Sub-Remed is 
significantly larger than that on MW Sub-Remed (p-value=0.10). These results indicate that the 
                                                        
24 Note that if the client is already remediating the material weakness at the time of issuance of the GCO, the MWO 
may not be issued. We use our remediation proxy to capture situations where the auditor issues a MWO but 
anticipates remediation in the near future. 
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auditor considers the remediation plans/process of the material weaknesses when it decides 
whether to issue a GCO.25  
The MWO and the Firm’s Ability to Raise Capital 
As explained in Section 2, one reason why the MWO can impact the GCO is that the 
negative consequences associated with a material weakness can make it difficult for firms that 
are already in financial distress to borrow capital. This could exacerbate the financial distress of 
the firm and increase the auditor’s uncertainty about the ability of the firm to operate as a going 
concern. To examine this possibility, we investigate whether the MWO impairs the firm’s ability 
to raise capital in the subsequent financial year. In separate regressions, we regress the change in 
short-term debt, change in long-term debt, and change in common stock on MWO, while 
controlling for factors that can influence a firm’s ability to raise capital. The change in short-term 
debt (long-term debt, common stock) is defined as short-term debt (long-term debt, common 
stock) in year t+1 minus the current debt (long-term debt, common stock) in year t.  
We estimate the three regressions for our sample, as well as for a broader sample of all 
firms with available SOX 404 opinions in the period 2004 to 2009. Untabulated results reveal 
that, for our sample, the issuance of a MWO (MWO) is significantly and negatively associated 
with the subsequent change in short-term debt (p-value = 0.04), and also negatively associated 
with the change in common stock, although with weak statistical significance (p-value = 0.109). 
For the broader sample, MWO is negatively associated with the change in short-term debt (p-
value = 0.08), the change in long-term debt (p-value = 0.01), and the change in common stock 
(again with marginal statistical significance, p-value = 0.105). Thus, MWO has a negative effect 
on subsequent financing, even for a sample that is not confined to financially stressed companies.  
                                                        
25 An alternative explanation for this result is that the auditor may perceive higher litigation risk if it fails to issue a 




Taken together, these results suggest that firms with MWOs raise less capital in the 
subsequent financial year than firms without MWOs, providing some evidence that the issuance 
of a material weakness opinion does impair the firm’s ability to raise capital. This can raise the 
auditor’s concern about the client’s ability to overcome financial distress, engendering increased 
conservatism in the GCO decision.  
Litigation Risk and the Association between MWO and GCO 
 As discussed, one possible explanation for a positive association between the MWO and 
the GCO is that the issuance of a MWO causes increased scrutiny and potential concern about 
litigation, inducing conservatism in the auditor’s GCO decision. If so, we would expect the 
association between MWO and GCO to be stronger for more litigious industries. In order to test 
this expectation, we partition our sample into high litigation–risk and low litigation-risk groups, 
and estimate our model for each group.26 We find that, for high litigation industries, the MWO 
has a positive and significant association (untabulated) with the GCO (p-value = 0.06). However, 
there is no significant association between the MWO and the GCO for low-litigation risk 
industries (p-value = 0.27). Thus, heightened concerns about litigation may be driving auditors to 
issue the GCO when they also issue a MWO. 
SOX 302 Material Weaknesses and the GCO 
In this section, we examine whether there is an association between the existence of 
material weaknesses, as reported in Section 302 disclosures about material weaknesses, and the 
GCO. Material weakness disclosures under Section 302 are not audited, and therefore do not 
reflect the auditor’s opinion on the status of internal controls. As discussed, the existence of a 
material weakness creates uncertainty about the reliability of financial reporting. However, we 
                                                        
26 Consistent with Francis et al. (1994), the high-litigation group consists of firms in the following industries: Bio-
technology (SIC 2833 to 2836), Computer Hardware (SIC 3570 to 3577), Electronics (SIC 3600 to 3674), Retailing 
(SIC 5200 to 5961), Computer Software (SIC 7371 to 7379), and R&D services (8731-8734). 
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conjecture that, in addition to the uncertainties that arise from the existence of material 
weaknesses, a material weakness opinion under SOX 404 may further induce conservatism in the 
auditor’s GCO decision because (1) the material weakness opinion makes it more difficult to 
raise financing and (2) litigation fears for auditors are likely greater under Section 404 than 
under Section 302. The auditor is not responsible for the material weakness disclosures under 
Section 302, and the guidelines for management discovery and disclosure of the weaknesses 
were relatively vague (Hoitash et al. 2009).27 By contrast, the MWO is the result of an audit that 
is conducted as part of an integrated audit. Hence, we compare our results above, which linked 
the MWO to the GCO, with that obtained in a model linking material weaknesses disclosures 
with the GCO.28 
In Table 7, we present the analysis for two different samples, both of which were not 
subject to the requirements of Section 404. In Columns 1-2, we include material weaknesses 
disclosed under SOX 302 for the period January 2003 to October 2004, which is the period 
preceding SOX 404 reporting. In Columns 3-4, we include SOX 302 disclosed material 
weaknesses for our test period (i.e., November 2004 to December 2009) for a sample of non-
accelerated filers that were not subject to the requirements of Section 404. We estimate models 
similar to those reported in Table 4, except that the variable MWO is replaced by MW302, which 
is an indicator variable coded 1 if there are Section 302 disclosures of material weaknesses in 
                                                        
27 Research results on stock market reaction – which can possibly be used to infer litigation concerns - to Section 
302 and Section 404 disclosures of material weaknesses yield mixed results. Beneish et al. (2008) report negative 
stock market reactions to Section 404 but not to Section 302 disclosures of material weaknesses. However, other 
studies show negative reactions to material weakness disclosures under both Sections 302 and 404 (e.g., 
Hammersley et al. 2008; Ashbaugh et al. 2009. See Schneider et al. 2009 for a review of studies). 
28 Admittedly, this comparison between the Section 302 and 404 regimes assumes implicitly that the material 
weaknesses identified are similar, and that the two regimes differ only in the issuance of an ICFR audit report under 
Section 404. This may not be true, because Section 302 weaknesses are identified by management. Moreover, the 
vague guidelines allowed discretion on the part of management (Hoitash et al. 2009). Therefore the lack of 
association between material weaknesses under Section 302 and the GCO that we document may be due to noise in 
the material weakness disclosures. 
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any quarterly (10-Q) filing, and 0 otherwise.29 
 [Insert Table 7 here] 
The results in Table 7 are different from those reported in Table 4, which is based on the 
SOX 404 sample. Specifically, the coefficient on MW302 is insignificant in Table 7, Columns 1-
2 (p-value = 0.17) and Columns 3-4 (p-value = 0.36), indicating that management disclosure of 
material weaknesses does not impact the GCO. This finding, together with the finding in Table 4, 
is consistent with the expectation that auditors respond to the uncertainties surrounding a 
material weakness by issuing a GCO only when they have to issue a MWO, and not due to the 
existence of material weaknesses per se.  
6. Conclusions 
Section 404 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and Auditing Standard No. 2 (which was 
subsequently replaced by Auditing Standard No. 5) introduced integrated audits of internal 
control and the financial statements. The ICFR report provides information about internal control, 
and is expected to engender an improvement in financial reporting quality by forcing managers 
to assess their internal control. The new auditing standards describe how the internal control 
audit can be integrated into the financial statement audit. Considerable discussion has surrounded 
the new auditing standards. However, all of this attention has centered on the internal control 
disclosures and their consequences, and what has been alleged to be high compliance costs 
imposed by these rules. 
Little attention has been given to the impact of the new rules on the audit of the financial 
statements, which after all is the primary goal of the independent auditor. There is apparently no 
expectation that the integrated audit, which in effect now produces two products, will affect the 
                                                        
29 The samples in Table 7 were generated in the same way as those in the previous tables. We started with stressed 
firms, and eliminated firms with missing data, or in the financial services industry. About 4.2 percent (18.4 percent) 
of the sample in Columns 1-2 (Columns 3-4) have disclosures of material weaknesses (i.e., have MW302=1). 
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“output” of the financial statement audit, the audit opinion. We examine whether, other things 
equal, the issuance of a MWO increases the likelihood of a GCO for financially stressed 
companies. In theory, the MWO need not impact the GCO as long as the auditor can audit 
around the material weaknesses. However, we argue that the uncertainties surrounding material 
weaknesses, the difficulty of auditing around some types of weaknesses, and the fact that the 
auditor must explain why it issued a clean report on the financial statements when it had issued a 
MWO, may cause the auditor to become conservative in its going concern opinion decision, 
which is fairly ambiguous to start with. 
 Using a sample of financially distressed firms, we find that a MWO increases the 
likelihood that the auditor issues a GCO. Further, the association holds for MWOs associated 
with company-level material weaknesses and not account-specific weaknesses, suggesting that 
the difficulty with auditing around the former may induce conservatism in the GCO decision. 
Also, the association holds for industries that are relatively more litigation-prone, but not for less 
litigious industries, suggesting that the MWO makes auditors more conservative in their GCO 
decisions when litigation concerns are paramount. To examine whether it is the material 
weakness opinion rather than the presence of the material weakness that drives auditor behavior, 
we examine whether Section 302 material weakness disclosures are similarly associated with the 
GCO, but find no association. Overall, we interpret our results as suggesting that, while the 
existence of material weaknesses increases the auditor’s uncertainty of the firm’s going concern, 
the act of issuing a MWO engenders conservatism in issuing the GCO.  
The results of this study have relevance for policymakers. The objective of Sections 302 
and 404 of SOX was to provide information on the internal controls of entities thus enhancing 
investors’ understanding of their financial statements. Although this was expected to enhance the 
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quality of financial reporting, there has been little discussion on how the new policies would 
impact the likelihood of the GCO. To the extent that the increase in the GCO likelihood is a 
result of auditor conservatism, our finding suggests the need for a broader evaluation of the 
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Sample Selection and Composition 
 
Panel A: Sample Selection  
 
Procedures Observations 
Firms with available data to compute Altman Z-score in 2004-2009    39,749 
Less: 
Non-stressed firms (31,802) 
 
Firms with missing SOX 404 audit opinions or going concern 
opinions in the Audit Analytics database (6,644) 
Firms with missing data in the Compustat and/or CRSP databases (185) 
Firms in the financial industry (8) 
Final Sample 1,110 
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Variable Definitions:  
GCO = indicator variable that equals 1 if the firm has a going concern audit opinion, and 0 otherwise. MWO = 





Descriptive Statistics and Variable Correlations 
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a  Differences in means (medians) are assessed using a t-test (Wilcoxon rank sum test). Wilcoxon test statistics are 
not presented for indicator variables. 
***, **, and * denote, respectively, statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, based on two-tailed tests.  
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Panel B: Pearson Correlations (top) and Spearman Correlations (bottom) 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 
1.  GCO 1.00  0.12  0.23  -0.29 0.01 0.01 0.25 -0.13 0.17 -0.04  0.11 -0.06 -0.04 -0.31 0.17 0.45 -0.05 -0.11  
2. MWO 0.12  1.00  0.00  -0.01 0.04 0.05 0.04 -0.01 0.05 0.02  -0.01 -0.14 -0.11 0.03 0.51 0.04 0.09 0.08  
3. PROBANKZ 0.28  0.02  1.00  -0.08 0.00 -0.06 0.21 -0.02 0.44 0.05  0.14 -0.04 0.05 -0.22 0.03 0.14 -0.19 -0.08  
4. SIZE -0.29  0.01  -0.11  1.00 0.09 -0.02 -0.25 0.06 -0.02 0.04  -0.26 -0.47 0.26 0.39 -0.17 -0.23 0.03 0.23  
5. AGE 0.04  0.03  0.03  0.04 1.00 -0.01 -0.06 0.08 0.06 -0.02  -0.09 -0.09 -0.01 0.10 -0.05 0.09 0.06 0.03  
6. BETA 0.00  0.06  -0.06  0.02 -0.03 1.00 0.13 0.13 0.00 0.00  0.01 0.03 0.03 -0.07 0.09 0.01 0.05 0.02  
7. VOLATILITY 0.25  0.04  0.21  -0.31 -0.03 0.10 1.00 0.34 0.10 0.02  0.11 0.02 -0.09 -0.31 0.08 0.25 -0.06 -0.01  
8. RETURN -0.15  -0.02  -0.05  0.11 0.05 0.12 0.09 1.00 0.09 -0.07  -0.02 0.05 0.05 0.00 -0.09 0.06 0.01 0.09  
9. LEV 0.09  0.05  0.80  0.23 0.12 -0.04 0.05 0.11 1.00 -0.64  0.03 -0.08 0.03 -0.22 0.06 0.16 -0.08 -0.03  
10. CLEV 0.17  0.05  0.56  -0.11 -0.06 -0.05 0.11 -0.18 0.40 1.00  0.00 -0.03 0.00 -0.02 0.01 -0.11 0.00 0.01  
11. DLOSS 0.11  -0.01  0.19  -0.24 -0.12 0.00 0.15 -0.04 0.05 0.13  1.00 0.19 0.04 -0.15 0.02 0.09 -0.04 -0.10  
12. INVESTMENT -0.06  -0.13  -0.04  -0.46 -0.09 0.03 0.05 0.04 -0.21 0.05  0.19 1.00 0.12 -0.19 -0.05 -0.01 -0.10 -0.04  
13. BIG4 -0.04  -0.11  0.04  0.26 -0.02 0.03 -0.09 0.08 0.07 0.04  0.04 0.12 1.00 0.00 -0.11 -0.05 -0.03 0.08  
14. OCF -0.33  0.05  -0.31  0.62 0.09 0.00 -0.25 0.18 0.05 -0.25  -0.38 -0.49 -0.05 1.00 -0.04 -0.20 0.09 0.12  
15. REPORTLAG 0.29  0.42  0.03  -0.27 -0.08 0.11 0.12 -0.17 -0.06 0.10  0.07 -0.06 -0.16 -0.16 1.00 0.07 0.03 0.00  
16. PRIORGCO 0.45  0.04  0.17  -0.23 0.10 -0.02 0.19 0.02 0.09 0.02  0.09 -0.01 -0.05 -0.22 0.14 1.00 -0.04 -0.09  
17. SEGMENTS -0.02  0.10  -0.20  0.07 0.04 0.04 -0.07 0.02 -0.12 -0.11  -0.05 -0.10 -0.01 0.15 0.02 -0.01 1.00 0.21  
18. 
RESTRUCTURING -0.11  0.08  -0.09  0.22 0.01 0.02 -0.04 0.10 0.01 -0.09  -0.10 -0.03 0.08 0.17 -0.05 -0.09 0.22 1.00  
 
bPearson and Spearman correlations are shown, respectively, above and below the diagonal. Bold text in panel B indicates that correlations are significantly 
different from 0 at p-value ≤ 0.10 (two-tailed). 
 
Variable Definitions: 
GCO = 1 if the firm has a going concern audit opinion, and 0 otherwise. MWO = 1 if the firm has a material weakness internal control opinion under Section 404, 
and 0 otherwise. PROBANKZ = probability of bankruptcy calculated using the Zmijewski (1984) model. SIZE = natural logarithm of total assets of the company 
at the fiscal year end. AGE = natural logarithm of the number of years the firm has CRSP data. BETA = firm’s beta estimated using the market model over the 
fiscal year. VOLATILITY = standard deviation of the residual from the market model over the fiscal year. RETURN = market-adjusted return over the fiscal year. 
LEV = total liabilities over total assets at the end of the fiscal year. CLEV = Change in LEV during the year. DLOSS = 1 if the firm reports a bottom-line loss for 
the previous year, and 0 otherwise. INVESTMENT = short-term and long-term investment securities, including cash and cash equivalents scaled by total assets. 
BIG4 = 1 if the auditor is a Big 4 auditor, and 0 otherwise. OCF = operating cash flows scaled by total assets. REPORTLAG = number of days between the fiscal 
year-end and the earnings announcement date. PRIORGCO = 1 for firms with going concern audit opinions in the prior year, and 0 otherwise.  SEGMENTS = the 
natural logarithm of the number of operating and geographic segments reported by the Compustat Segments database for the firm over the fiscal year. 
RESTRUCTURING = 1 if the firm reports restructuring activity in the prior or current fiscal year, and 0 otherwise. 
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Table 4  
Logistic Regression for the Association Between GCO and MWO 
 






  P-value 
INTERCEPT -5.55** 5.58  0.02  
MWO 0.72** 4.11  0.04  
PROBANKZ 0.61* 2.65  0.10  
SIZE -0.53*** 14.86  <0.01  
AGE 0.09  0.33  0.57  
BETA 0.02  0.08  0.78  
VOLATILITY 5.22*** 22.26  <0.01 
RETURN -11.07*** 31.65  <0.01 
LEV 0.01  0.00  0.97  
CLEV -0.11  0.10  0.75  
DLOSS 0.45  0.77  0.38  
INVESTMENT -2.79*** 26.40  <0.01 
BIG4 0.86*** 8.13  <0.01  
OCF -1.28*** 12.28  <0.01  
REPORTLAG 0.83* 2.96  0.09  
PRIORGCO 2.39*** 47.14  <0.01 
SEGMENTS -0.05  0.34  0.56  
RESTRUCTURING -0.22  0.72  0.40  
N 1,110 
Likelihood Ratio  366.16 
(p-value) (<0.01) 
Pseudo R2 (%) 28 
 
All variables are defined in Table 3.  





Table 5  
Regression Results after Controlling for Endogeneity of MWO 
 
Panel A: Heckman Two-stage Estimation and Propensity-Score Matchinga 
 
Heckman Second-stage Regression 
 














 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
INTERCEPT -7.00***  7.60 0.01  -1.46  0.12  0.72 
MWO 0.92*** 6.05 0.01  1.88*** 6.93  <0.01 
Control Variables Included   Included   
LAMBDA 0.51* 2.65 0.10     
N 1,110 264 




Pseudo R2 (%) 28 36 
 
Panel B: Simultaneity between GCO and MWOb 
 
 
Going Concern Opinion (GCO) 
Equation 














 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
INTERCEPT -25.99*** 15.58  <0.01 12.06 0.0005  0.98 
MWO 1.10** 4.41  0.04     
GCO    1.51*** 10.04  <0.01 
Control Variables Included   Included   
N 1,110 1,110 
Likelihood Ratio 375.20 179.61 
(p-value) (<0.01) (<0.01) 
Pseudo R2 (%) 29 15 
a The dependent variable in Panel A is GCO. The results in Columns 1-3 in Panel A are from the second stage 
regression of the Heckman (1979) two-stage procedure, after controlling for LAMBDA. LAMBDA is the inverse 
Mills ratio calculated from the first stage regression in which we regress MWO on its determinants. The results of 
the first-stage are provided in Appendix A. The results in Columns 4-6 are based on a propensity-scoring matching 
technique, using the probit estimates from the Appendix to generate a matching sample of non-GCO observations. 
See text for further details. The model for GCO (MWO) includes all control variables listed in Table 4 (the 
Appendix). Only the test variables are shown for brevity. 
b Panel B reports estimates for a simultaneous-equations model for MWO and GCO. The models include all control 
variables listed in Table 4. Only the test variables are shown for brevity. 
 Variable definitions are provided in Table 3 and Appendix A.   






Material Weaknesses Type, Remediation, and the Going-Concern Opinion 
 
Panel A: Regression Results for Material Weakness Types 
 







INTERCEPT -5.58** 5.66  0.02  
MW Company-Level 1.17*** 8.58  <0.01  
MW Account-Specific -0.20 0.12  0.73  
Control Variables Included   
N 1,110 
Likelihood Ratio   372.01 
(p-value) (<0.01) 
Pseudo R2 (%) 28 
 
MW Company-Level (MW Account-Specific) is an indicator variable that equals 1 if the firm disclosed a company-
level (account-specific) material weakness and 0 otherwise. All variables are defined in Table 3.  
*, **, *** Denote significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels, respectively, based on two-tailed 
tests. 
 
Panel B: Regression Results for MW Remediation Status 
 







INTERCEPT -6.21*** 6.71 0.01  
MW Sub-Remed 0.46 1.15 0.28  
MW No-Sub-Remed 0.93** 3.88 0.05  
Control Variables Included   
 
Na 1,106 
Likelihood Ratio  361.09 
(p-value) (<0.01) 
Pseudo R2 (%) 28 
 
MW Sub-Remed (MW No-Sub-Remed) is an indicator variable that equals 1 if the MW firms remediate (do not 
remediate)  MWs in the subsequent year, and 0 otherwise. All other variables are defined in Table 3.  
a For four firms, we could not determine the remediation status of the material weaknesses because they were 
delisted by the SEC.  




Table 7  
Material Weakness Disclosures under Section 302 and the Going-Concern Opinion 
 
 Dependent Variable : GCO 
 
302 sample (January 2003 to 
October 2004) 











 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
INTERCEPT -16.97***  0.01  -12.00*** <0.01 
MW302 -1.55 0.17  0.25  0.36  
PROBANKZ 0.69  0.30  1.71*** <0.01 
SIZE 0.13  0.50  -0.29*** 0.01  
AGE -0.39  0.21  0.07  0.51  
BETA 0.04  0.50  0.06** 0.05  
VOLATILITY 2.30  0.11  1.91** 0.02  
RETURN -4.44*  0.09  -5.45*** <0.01  
LEV -0.10  0.81  0.20  0.33  
CLEV 0.82* 0.06  -0.06  0.78  
DLOSS -0.15  0.90  0.40  0.31  
INVESTMENT -1.76* 0.06  -1.07*** 0.01  
BIG4 -1.12** 0.03  0.15  0.53  
OCF -0.78  0.10  -0.48** 0.03  
REPORTLAG 3.42**  0.02  2.08*** <0.01  
PRIORGCO 2.64*** <0.01 2.32*** <0.01 
SEGMENTS -0.15  0.35  0.01  0.85  
RESTRUCTURING -0.16  0.71  -0.02  0.95  
     
N 332  728  
Likelihood Ratio  160.23  375.35  
(p-value) (<0.01)  (<0.01)  
Pseudo R2 (%) 39  40  
 
All variables are defined in Table 3.  













INTERCEPT 4.00  0.00  0.98  
MARKETCAP -0.04  0.81  0.37  
AGE 0.06  0.70  0.40  
AGGREGATELOSS 0.67**  5.48  0.02  
SEGMENTS 0.04  1.88  0.17  
FOREIGNOP 0.00  0.00  0.97  
MA -0.38*  3.44  0.06  
EXTREMESALESGROWTH 0.02  0.03  0.87  
RESTRUCTURING 0.26**  4.69  0.03  
BIG4 -0.23* 3.15  0.08  
RESTATEMENT 1.13*** 62.80  <0.01 
AUDITORCHANGE 0.57***  11.52  <0.01  
INDUSTRY DUMMIES Included  
N 1,110 
Likelihood ratio  179.14 
(p-value) (<0.01) 
 
This table reports the first stage results of the Heckman (1979) two-stage procedure to control for the self-selection 
of MWO. The dependent variable is MWO, which is an indicator variable that equals 1 if the firm has a MWO, and 0 
otherwise. MARKETCAP, market capitalization, equals log of share price multiplied by number of shares 
outstanding. AGE is firm age, the number of years since the firm appears in CRSP database. AGGREGATELOSS is 
an indicator variable that equals 1 if net income before extraordinary items in years t and t-1 sum to less than zero, 
and 0 otherwise. SEGMENTS is the log of the sum of the number of operating and geographic segments reported by 
the Compustat Segments database for the firm in year t. FOREIGNOP is an indicator variable that equals 1 if the 
firm has a non-zero foreign currency translation, and 0 otherwise. MA is an indicator variable that equals 1 if the 
firm has a non-zero merger and acquisition activity. EXTREMESALESGROWTH is an indicator variable that equals 
1 if year-over-year industry-adjusted sales growth falls into the top quintile, and 0 otherwise. RESTRUCTURING is 
an indicator variable that equals 1 if the firm reports restructuring activity in the prior or current fiscal year, and 0 
otherwise. BIG4 is an indicator variable that equals 1 if the firm engaged one of the largest four audit firms, and 0 
otherwise. Largest four audit firms include PWC, Deloitte, Ernst & Young, and KPMG. RESTATEMENT is an 
indicator variable that equals 1 if the firm had a restatement in the twelve months period before the disclosure of 
MWs, and 0 otherwise. AUDITORCHANGE is an indicator variable that equals 1 if the firm changed auditor during 
the twelve month period before the disclosure of MWs, and 0 otherwise.  
 
*, **, *** Denote significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels, respectively, based on two-tailed 
tests. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
